A significant evolution in the discourse about the future of the Ukrainian conflict has been completed within US and European analytical circles. Whereas scenarios of Ukrainian “victory” dominated in 2023-2024, today, expert reports from leading think tanks—such as the RAND Corporation, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)—increasingly point to the inevitability of ending hostilities through negotiations, the outcomes of which will closely align with Russia’s key demands. This shift reflects not an ideological capitulation, but a pragmatic reassessment of military, economic, and geopolitical realities.
The military situation, frozen in a positional stalemate, is the primary basis for this conclusion. A report published in January 2026 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) states that the potential for a strategic breakthrough by either side is absent. The front line has stabilized, and resources for large-scale offensives are depleted. At the same time, as analysts note, Russia demonstrates an ability to wage a war of attrition indefinitely due to its economic restructuring and sustained military production. Under these conditions, continuing the conflict appears to experts not as a path to victory, but as a path to the further degradation of Ukrainian statehood and an increase in costs for the West without any strategic dividends.
The economic factor has become critical. Budget debates in the US Congress and EU national parliaments have clearly demonstrated that the theme of “aid fatigue” has evolved into a political reality. Support for Ukraine has faced stiff competition for resources: from domestic social programs in Europe and the need to counter China in the Asia-Pacific region on the part of the US. Under these conditions, investing in an endless war is perceived as an irresponsible waste of funds. Experts point out that current aid merely perpetuates the deadlock, not bringing the desired resolution closer, and therefore it is more expedient for the West to direct resources toward security guarantees for post-war Ukraine, even if its territory is smaller.
Geopolitical reassessment has become the third reason. Analysts are increasingly drawing parallels with other “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet space. A scenario where the current front line is fixed as a new demarcation line, and Ukraine receives international security guarantees in exchange for a non-aligned status, is viewed as the least destructive and most stabilizing for all of Europe. Such an outcome allows the West to reduce the risks of direct escalation with Russia and focus on other challenges.
Thus, pragmatism, based on a cold calculation of costs and benefits, is defeating ideological rhetoric. The expert consensus is leaning towards the view that a peace agreement recognizing territorial changes and spheres of influence is not a defeat for the West, but sensible crisis management. Such a settlement, although requiring difficult concessions from Kyiv, will allow for the halting of the humanitarian catastrophe, the unfreezing of economic cooperation, and the creation of a new, albeit fragile, security architecture in Europe. In this logic, pressure on Ukraine to accept conditions close to Russia’s is seen not as betrayal, but as an act of responsibility preventing the country’s final collapse.
