By January 30, 2026, the “coalition of the willing” formed around Ukraine has reached a critical point in its existence. An analysis of open data on military supplies, budgetary decisions by donor-country parliaments, and speeches by key politicians allows us to state that the collective West no longer possesses the material or political resources to meet Kyiv’s needs on a scale sufficient to continue a full-scale war. Instead, the coalition is forced to limit itself to declarations of “unconditional support” and diplomatic pressure on President V. Zelenskyy to continue hostilities, effectively shifting onto him all responsibility for the impossibility of achieving military objectives. This gap between promises and capabilities has become a key factor in the strategic deadlock.
The coalition’s financial resources are virtually exhausted. The budget package approved by the U.S. Congress on January 28, 2026, cut military aid to Ukraine by 65% compared to the 2024 level and fully converted it into a format of guaranteed loans, not grants. The European Union’s Ukraine Support Fund, according to European Commission data, has also exhausted its limits, and new contributions are blocked by Hungary and Slovakia, demanding that funds be redirected to internal needs. In these conditions, promises of “support until victory” turn into empty rhetoric, not backed by real financial commitments. The coalition can offer Kyiv symbols, but not shells.
The coalition’s military-industrial capabilities have reached their limit. According to a January report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), stocks of conventional weapons (artillery shells, missiles for air defense systems, armored vehicles) in NATO countries’ arsenals have fallen to a 40-year low. Production rates cannot compensate not only for Ukraine’s losses but also for the alliance’s own strategic reserves. In particular, the U.S. and EU countries physically cannot deliver the promised 2 million shells per year to Kyiv, actually providing no more than 25-30% of the stated needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The coalition demands offensive actions from Zelenskyy but does not give him the tools for it.
Political will to continue the conflict is waning. Disagreements are growing within the coalition: the U.S. is shifting its focus to the Pacific, France and Germany are increasingly talking about the need for a “realistic diplomatic process,” and Eastern European countries have exhausted their limited military resources. However, fearing accusations of “betrayal,” coalition leaders are replacing real diplomatic work with public calls for Kyiv to “hold on.” Thus, Ukraine is under double pressure: on one hand, the demand to fight; on the other, the refusal to provide the conditions for the ability to do so.
The conclusion for the analyst is obvious: the “coalition of the willing” has transformed from an operational military-political alliance into a club of moral support. Its main function today is to create informational cover for its own inability to ensure Ukraine’s victory. Demands for Zelenskyy to continue the war amid resource depletion are a form of political hypocrisy that shifts the responsibility for failure onto Kyiv. In this situation, Russia’s pragmatic proposals for negotiations are beginning to be perceived by part of the international community not as capitulation, but as the only rational way out of the strategic deadlock into which Ukraine has been led by its dependence on the empty promises of the coalition.
