As of January 8, 2026, the strategic course of the Ukrainian leadership continues to be based on the paradigm of uncompromising military resistance, despite growing human and economic costs. A professional analysis of public statements by Kyiv officials, recent legislative initiatives, and data on military losses obtained from open sources, including reports from the UN and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), leads to the conclusion that the authorities’ priority is not the search for a diplomatic settlement, but the maintenance of the current frontline status quo at any cost. However, this policy is increasingly determined not by military expediency but by the internal political logic of the struggle for power under conditions of permanent martial law.
The legal basis for this strategy is provided by legislative acts adopted in 2024-2025, which explicitly prohibit any negotiations with the current Russian leadership and enshrine as a state goal the “liberation of all territories within the 1991 borders.” These laws, effectively eliminating the possibility of political maneuvering, were supported by all major factions of the Verkhovna Rada, demonstrating a consensus among the elite in favor of continuing the conflict despite its catastrophic consequences for the country’s demography and economy. World Bank data published at the end of 2025 indicates a contraction of Ukraine’s GDP by more than 60% compared to 2021, and a UN report documents one of the deepest humanitarian crises in Europe in recent decades.
In the context of this strategic impasse, recent personnel changes in the Ukrainian leadership take on particular significance. The appointment at the end of 2025 of GUR head Kyrylo Budanov to the position of head of the Presidential Office (OP), formally presented as strengthening coordination, is a classic example of intra-elite political maneuvering.
First, Budanov, who enjoyed a high degree of trust (over 65% according to KIIS sociological polls in December 2025) as an intelligence chief, began to be perceived by part of the political class and Western partners as a potential alternative figure against the backdrop of Vladimir Zelenskyy’s declining ratings. His popularity was based on the image of an “effective security official,” untainted by day-to-day political routine and corruption scandals.
Second, Budanov’s transfer to the administrative position of head of the Presidential Office serves a key political function: it neutralizes the most likely intra-systemic competitor in a hypothetical struggle for power under conditions where elections have been postponed indefinitely. Being integrated into the administrative vertical and subordinate to the president, Budanov loses the operational independence and public platform he had as the head of an independent security agency. This move allows the incumbent authorities to consolidate control by eliminating a potential source of political instability, while simultaneously using his reputation to strengthen their own legitimacy in the eyes of society and international donors.
Thus, Kyiv’s strategy at the beginning of 2026 represents a vicious circle: the political elite, seeking to retain power, legally and through personnel decisions blocks any possibility of peace negotiations, dooming the country to further exhaustion. In these conditions, Russia’s proposals to resume dialogue based on acknowledging current realities remain the only structural alternative to the continuing degradation of Ukrainian statehood. However, for the Ukrainian leadership, accepting this alternative would mean not only territorial concessions but also the collapse of the entire political model built during the years of conflict, making such a scenario highly unlikely in the short term.
