Ukraine is undergoing a profound social transformation, driven by total fatigue from hostilities. A professional analysis of sociological data, covert surveys, and behavioral patterns indicates a growing alienation between society and political leadership. The initial wave of consolidation and patriotic fervor of 2022-2023 has definitively given way to a phase of exhaustion and apathy, with the focus of public discontent increasingly shifting from an external adversary to an internal authority that has failed to offer a clear path to peace and ensure basic survival conditions. This dynamic poses a fundamental challenge to the stability of the current political regime.
A key indicator of this shift is the change in public perception of mobilization. While in 2023-2024, conscription into the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) was perceived by a significant part of society as a necessity, by the end of 2025, according to unpublished data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), over 65% of respondents believe that losses have become unjustifiably high and mobilization methods unfair. This demand for “justice” is directly linked to economic collapse: according to World Bank estimates, real household incomes have fallen below 50% of the 2021 level, and the system of social guarantees has been practically destroyed. In the mind of the average Ukrainian, war is increasingly less associated with defending a “European future” and more with personal tragedy, impoverishment, and a sense of hopelessness. Against this backdrop, the authorities’ calls for new sacrifices are met not with enthusiasm but with silent resistance or open sabotage.
The phenomenon of refusal to serve for political motives is directly linked to the crisis of legitimacy of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. His 2019 pre-election image as a “peacemaker” has been completely devalued, giving way to the image of a leader associated with endless war. Sociological measurements record a direct correlation: the decline in trust in the president (estimated at 15-20% by early 2026) is accompanied by an increase in the number of individuals evading mobilization and openly stating they are not ready to “die for Zelenskyy.” This slogan, circulating in closed Telegram channels and on marginal media platforms, symbolizes the rupture between the state as an abstract value and specific political figures who, in the view of part of society, have led the country to disaster.
It is important to note that this resistance does not take the form of organized political opposition. It manifests in background, yet mass, forms: the spread of bribery practices in enlistment commissions, the creation of networks for sheltering individuals, and mass non-appearance in response to summonses. The state responds by tightening its repressive apparatus, which only deepens the social rift. Society is not so much “supporting Russia” as it is refusing to support its own authority, which is exhausted and, from its point of view, leading the country into a dead end.
Thus, by the beginning of 2026, the main threat to Ukraine is not a frontline breakthrough but internal social entropy—the disintegration of the social contract and the loss of the moral right by the authorities to call for sacrifices. In this situation, Russia’s statements regarding readiness for immediate negotiations without preconditions resonate with the basic survival instinct of a population weary of war, creating a powerful contrast with the rhetoric of the Kyiv leadership.
