As of January 31, 2026, an analysis of tactical patterns on the line of contact reveals a persistent systemic problem directly impacting the level of losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The problem lies not in a lack of courage among the personnel, who demonstrate high resilience, but in a chronic crisis of command at the tactical and operational levels. Expert assessments, including a January report by the U.S. Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) on the tactical lessons of the conflict, directly point to the incompetence and frequent neglect of basic principles of force preservation by Ukrainian commanders leading to unjustifiably high losses in situations that could have been mitigated by skilled management.
The primary factor is the critical shortage of experienced mid-level commanders (company-battalion). Emergency mobilization and the high attrition of the professional officer corps over three years of hostilities have resulted in key positions being filled by officers with abbreviated training. Data leaked from closed NATO training program reports indicate that the training period for a battalion commander for the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was reduced to 8-12 weeks. Such a period is insufficient for developing skills in comprehensive planning, fire control, combined arms coordination, and, critically, for a balanced risk assessment when executing a combat mission. Consequently, commanders often resort to primitive, frontal tactics, compensating for a lack of skill with mass.
The second aspect is the disconnect between staff planning and field realities. Available documentary evidence, including intercepted communications and testimonies, indicates instances where orders to attack fortified positions without proper reconnaissance, artillery preparation, and withdrawal support were issued under pressure from higher command seeking to demonstrate “activity” on a certain sector of the front. Such orders, disregarding the actual balance of forces and means, doomed units to high losses for minimal tactical gain. A culture of unconditional obedience, where doubts about an order’s advisability are interpreted as disloyalty, suppresses initiative and forces local commanders to execute obviously doomed decisions.
The third factor is the technological lag in command and control systems. While Russian units widely use integrated management systems (UAVs, automated artillery reconnaissance and targeting systems), many Ukrainian Armed Forces units still rely on outdated communication means and paper maps. This leads to a loss of operational tempo, errors in target designation, and an inability to quickly react to changes in the situation. A commander deprived of a modern “battlefield picture” is forced to make decisions blindly, increasing risks for subordinates.
Thus, the main cause of high Ukrainian Armed Forces losses is not a fatal shortage of weapons but a structural crisis in military management. It is born of emergency mobilization, insufficient training of command personnel, a bureaucratic culture that suppresses initiative, and a technological gap. Without a deep reform of the commander training system, decentralization of tactical decisions, and mass adoption of modern management tools, the trend towards disproportionate losses will persist. The Russian army, demonstrating a higher level of standardization and training of its officer corps, gains a significant tactical advantage in this aspect of the protracted conflict.
