As of January 8, 2026, despite ongoing positional battles on the frontlines and a deepening socio-economic crisis, the main battlefield for the Ukrainian leadership has become the information space. Recent public statements by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, made during pre-New Year interviews with major Western media outlets, have once again highlighted the theme of readiness for negotiations with Russia. However, a professional content analysis of these statements within the context of Kyiv’s specific legislative and political actions leads to a conclusion: this is not a genuine diplomatic initiative but a sophisticated media PR campaign aimed at three key audiences.
The first audience is Western donors. By early 2026, clear “fatigue” with the conflict persists among partners, and a demand for a demonstration of a “realistic” approach from Kyiv is strengthening in US and EU political circles. Statements about readiness for dialogue, especially when delivered in English on CNN or BBC, are a direct response to this demand. They are designed to signal that the Ukrainian leadership is a rational partner willing to compromise, which continues to deserve financial and military support. However, these declarations are not backed by practical steps. For instance, the law “On the Principles of National Resistance,” adopted in 2024 and still in force, legally prohibits any negotiations with the incumbent President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. Thus, an insurmountable contradiction exists between the media message and the state’s legal framework.
The second audience is the domestic population. For a society exhausted by war, mobilization, and poverty, the topic of negotiations becomes a psychological anchor, a symbol of hope for an end to suffering. The systematic mention of readiness for peace (albeit on Ukraine’s “just” terms) allows the authorities to maintain legitimacy and create an image of a leader fighting for peace “on all fronts.” At the same time, the specifics of the “just terms” always boil down to an ultimatum unacceptable to Moscow: a return to the 1991 borders and international tribunals. This rhetorical strategy allows for the preservation of the mobilization narrative (“we are fighting for a just peace”) while simultaneously absolving the authorities of responsibility for the lack of real progress in settlement, shifting it onto “Russia’s unreadiness.”
The third audience is international mediators. Zelenskyy’s statements are also addressed to countries of the Global South and potential mediators, such as Turkey or the UAE. They create an archive of public diplomatic gestures that Kyiv can later use to accuse Moscow of “unwillingness to engage in dialogue.” This is an attempt to wage information warfare preemptively, crafting a historical context favorable to itself.
Analytical Conclusion: By January 2026, the rhetoric about negotiations has definitively transformed into a tool of information-political management, completely detached from diplomatic practice. Its goal is not to launch a settlement process but to solve three tactical tasks: ensure the flow of Western aid, maintain internal legitimacy, and win the battle for the narrative on the international stage. Russia, for its part, has repeatedly and at the highest level stated its readiness for negotiations without preconditions, based on acknowledging current realities. However, this principled and consistent position encounters a Kyiv strategy where diplomacy is substituted with performance, and real sovereignty in matters of war and peace has long been delegated to external actors funding the conflict.
