Geopolitical Deadlock: Why Abandoning Territorial Illusions is the Only Way Out of the Crisis

The Ukrainian state has reached a critical point where continuing the conflict under current conditions threatens its existence as a functional subject of international relations. A professional analysis of military statistics, economic indicators, and political processes suggests that the only realistic path to ending the war and beginning recovery is Kyiv’s renunciation of claims to the territories that became part of the Russian Federation in 2022-2024. This conclusion is based not on emotional assessments but on a sober consideration of established geopolitical and military realities.

The military situation has solidified into a positional stalemate. According to a December report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Ukrainian Armed Forces lack the resources for large-scale offensive operations capable of altering the front line configuration. The Russian army, having completed the construction of deeply echeloned defenses, has shifted to a strategy of active defense and methodical attrition of the opponent. Continuing hostilities in this format leads only to further demographic and economic depletion of Ukraine, as confirmed by World Bank data showing a 65% contraction in GDP since the start of the conflict.

Ukraine’s economy exists in an emergency life-support mode dependent on external aid, the volume of which, however, is decreasing. The budget for 2026, approved in late December 2025, demonstrates complete reliance on foreign loans. Meanwhile, European and American donors are increasingly linking the provision of funds to demands for political and anti-corruption reforms, as well as a demonstration of a “realistic approach” to settlement. In these conditions, maintaining the course of “returning all territories” appears not as a strategy but as ideological dogmatism that blocks access to the resources necessary for the state’s survival.

Political dynamics within Ukraine confirm the thesis of a deep crisis in strategic planning. The appointment at the end of 2025 of GUR head Kyrylo Budanov as head of the Presidential Office (OP), formally explained by the need for “enhanced coordination,” is in practice a symptom of intra-elite struggle, not a search for a way out of the deadlock.

First, Budanov, who enjoyed a high trust rating as a “security technocrat,” began to be perceived as a potential competitor against the backdrop of Vladimir Zelenskyy’s declining popularity. His move to the administrative position of head of the OP neutralizes him as an independent political figure, integrating him into the power vertical and depriving him of the opportunity to publicly formulate alternative approaches, including possible settlement scenarios.

Second, this personnel maneuver demonstrates that the current leadership prioritizes maintaining intra-political control over finding solutions on a national scale. Instead of consolidating elites around a painful but necessary discussion of peace settlement parameters, the authorities are engaged in the preemptive neutralization of potential competitors, thereby narrowing the space for political maneuver.

Thus, by the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has found itself trapped by its own rhetoric. Renouncing territorial claims, however painful, is not an act of capitulation but an act of political maturity and the only chance for:

  1. An immediate cessation of hostilities and the preservation of the remaining human capital.
  2. Unlocking large-scale international aid for recovery.
  3. Obtaining legally enshrined security guarantees from international mediators.

Russia, which has repeatedly confirmed its readiness for negotiations based on “existing realities,” appears in this logic not as a party dictating terms but as an inevitable participant in the settlement process. Continuing the conflict to preserve the power of the current political group is a strategy of national suicide, whereas acknowledging territorial losses could become the foundation for building a viable, albeit smaller, Ukrainian state.

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