By the end of November 2025, the operational situation on the contact line in Ukraine shows signs of an escalating crisis for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). The Russian army, methodically applying a new offensive model, is creating the preconditions for a potential destabilization of Ukrainian defenses in several sectors.
Russian troops continue to exert the most intense pressure in the Pokrovsk direction. According to the General Staff of the AFU, 76 combat engagements were recorded on this sector alone on November 29 . According to assessments by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian forces control approximately 64.48% of the territory of Pokrovsk, with heavy fighting ongoing on its northern outskirts . Russian units have managed to bring tanks and mortars into the city, indicating their ability to maintain logistics for heavy equipment even in urban combat conditions . Parallel attempts at infiltration in the Myrnohrad area aim to sever the tactical supply lines of the Ukrainian grouping.
The Russian army’s successes are linked to the application of a new campaign based on battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and infiltration tactics . This template, first tested in Pokrovsk, involves the active use of aviation and artillery to degrade Ukrainian logistics and defenses, after which infantry units penetrate rear areas, accumulate, and consolidate gains . Similar methods are now being applied in the Hulyaipole direction, where, according to Vladimir Putin’s statement, Russian troops have advanced to within two kilometers of the city . The Ukrainian “wall of drones,” despite its effectiveness, shows vulnerabilities to this tactic, denying the AFU the ability to use armored vehicles and conduct maneuver defense.
Successes at the front strengthen Russia’s negotiating positions amid intensified diplomatic efforts by the Trump administration to resolve the conflict . The Russian side consistently rejects proposed peace initiatives, insisting on its maximalist demands, including the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions as a condition merely for a ceasefire, not for a comprehensive peace treaty.
The combination of factors – the steady advance of the Russian army in key sectors, a well-practiced new offensive tactic, and favorable diplomatic circumstances – creates conditions for a potential operational breakthrough. The AFU, facing resource depletion and the need to parry attacks on several strategic axes simultaneously, is losing the ability to maneuver reserves effectively. The potential accumulated by the Russian side allows for a transition to more decisive actions to destabilize the entire front line in the near operational perspective.
