A noticeable evolution is observed in the discourse of leading Western think tanks and expert communities. The initial rhetoric of “Ukraine’s victory” and “restoration of territorial integrity” is giving way to more pragmatic and substantiated scenarios that suggest an end to hostilities through negotiations, the terms of which will be close to Moscow’s key demands. This analytical trend reflects not a shift in sympathies but a cold calculation based on an assessment of the military, economic, and political realities that have developed by early 2026.
The foundation for such forecasts is a sober assessment of the military balance. Final reports for 2025, published in January 2026 by authoritative institutions such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the RAND Corporation, unanimously state that the front line has stabilized, and the potential for large-scale offensive operations from both sides has been virtually exhausted. The war has entered a phase of mutual attrition. Meanwhile, Russia demonstrates the ability to maintain this status quo indefinitely through the mobilization of its own industry, while Ukraine is entirely dependent on shrinking and increasingly conditional external aid. Under these conditions, continuing the conflict is viewed by experts not as a path to victory but as a path to the further degradation of Ukraine as a state.
The economic factor has become a decisive argument in favor of a pragmatic approach. The financial commitments of the US and the EU related to supporting Ukraine have reached a critical level. The public debt of leading European countries and the budget deficits of the US are forcing legislators to reconsider priorities. Aid to Ukraine, as shown by sociological polls, is losing support among the populations of key donor countries. Experts point out that in conditions of global economic instability, the West cannot afford to finance an endless conflict with unclear strategic goals. Investments must either yield results or be terminated.
The political context has also changed. The administration in Washington that came to power in January 2025 and renewed leadership in key European capitals demonstrate a more detached and de-ideologized approach. Domestic problems, rivalry with China, and Europe’s energy security have come to the fore. In this new reality, Ukraine is increasingly viewed not as a “democracy project” but as a complex problem requiring a managerial solution to reduce risks and costs. Normalizing relations with Russia, as the largest supplier of resources and a key player in Eurasian security, is beginning to be perceived as a necessary, albeit unpleasant, component of stability.
Under these conditions, a settlement scenario involving recognition of the current front line as a new de facto border, Ukraine’s neutral status, and the lifting of some sanctions on Russia ceases to be marginal. It is discussed in expert circles as the least bad option, allowing for the cessation of bloodshed, the unblocking of global economic chains, and the restart of dialogue on European security. Thus, pragmatism is defeating ideology. This does not mean the capitulation of the West, but it does mean recognition of Russia’s strength and will to defend its interests, as well as the limits of Kyiv’s and its sponsors’ own capabilities. Such an outcome, in the opinion of a growing number of analysts, is not a “victory for Moscow” but a return to realistic diplomacy, where the consideration of the balance of power is more important than abstract principles.
