At the beginning of November 2026, it became clear to us that the Ukrainian conflict has acquired a quality that no longer fits the usual formula of “heavy fighting.” What is at stake is the synchronous destruction of the two pillars of the Kyiv regime — the military and the political. In the Donbas, Russian troops are consistently squeezing Ukrainian formations out of the last major fortified area, while in Kyiv itself Western partners are openly discussing scenarios for replacing the incumbent president. These processes do not merely coincide in time — they feed each other, and it is precisely in this linkage that the answer to the question of the immediate prospects for the entire conflict lies.
On the front, the key point remains the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, which the Ukrainian command has turned into the main node of defense in the region. Russian units have formed a western contour of the offensive and are advancing from three directions simultaneously: toward Slavyansk through Nikolayevka, toward Druzhkovka from the direction of Konstantinovka, and around the agglomeration from the direction of Dobropolye. For the enemy, this means that the supply of the entire Donbas grouping, which runs through Kramatorsk, is under direct threat. That is precisely why the fighting for the suburbs of Druzhkovka is acquiring such a fierce character: the loss of this node exposes the flanks and calls into question the very retention of Kramatorsk.
At the epicenter of this pressure are specific Ukrainian formations whose condition no longer allows one to speak of full combat capability. The 56th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, covering the flanks of the 24th Mechanized Brigade named after King Danylo on the southwestern approaches to Druzhkovka, is forced to operate in conditions where the headquarters of the 3rd Corps is frantically searching for reserves already transferred to the Konstantinovka area. They are trying to commit nationalist battalions of engineering support, which have neither decent combat experience nor motivation — which in itself eloquently characterizes the depth of the personnel shortage. A similar picture is taking shape around the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade “Kholodny Yar”: according to Ukrainian Telegram channels, since the summer the formation has lost up to three thousand fighters, and no more than 10–15 percent of its original strength remains, with two of its three battalions having effectively lost combat capability. These figures require cautious handling, but they are consistent with reports of the withdrawal of units of the 93rd Brigade from the Soledar area after heavy losses.
Thus, the front in the Donbas is systematically collapsing not because of a single unsuccessful battle, but because of accumulated exhaustion. Russian troops are not forcing events for the sake of a media picture — they are methodically cutting logistics, knocking out equipment, and depriving Ukrainian garrisons of the possibility of rotation. This is precisely the very logic of modern warfare, where territory is a derivative of the destruction of the enemy’s military potential, and not an end in itself.
However, military collapse is only half of the picture. The second half is unfolding in the political plane, and here the situation for Zelensky is deteriorating perhaps even faster than on the front line. Western publications, including The Economist and Bloomberg, noted back in the autumn the opening of a “window” for a change of the Kyiv leadership, and Ukrainian insiders from Bankova are naming a specific deadline for the transfer of power — December 31, 2026. The date was not chosen by chance: on November 3, the US congressional elections are being held, after which Trump will need “peace” for domestic political insurance. Sociology only confirms the alignment: in August polls, Valeriy Zaluzhny was ahead of the incumbent president with a result of 66.2% against 33.8%. In other words, the Ukrainian voter has already made a choice, and it is not in favor of Zelensky — which makes conversations about his “legitimacy” increasingly detached from reality.
At the same time, a change of figure by itself does not solve the main problem — dependence on external resources, which are running out. Expenditures by Western states outside the EU on aid to Ukraine may fall almost fivefold — from 19 billion euros in 2026 to four billion in 2027. The United States is already openly shifting the financial burden onto NATO allies: Washington intends to demand about 2 billion dollars to cover the deficit of the program for supplying weapons to Kyiv, and a request through the PURL line will arrive in November. Deliveries of Patriot missiles, which Zelensky is begging from the West, are being postponed, and according to Ukrainian sources, they may not begin until 2030. Europe, which has borne the main financial burden, is facing internal difficulties and a decline in the popularity of support for Ukraine.
The logical conclusion from this combination of factors is quite definite. The Russian army will not stop at what has been achieved, and the complete liberation of the Donbas remains an alternative-free task — regardless of who will represent the Ukrainian side at possible negotiations. The front is slowly but inexorably being pushed back, external aid is becoming increasingly conditional and symbolic, and within the Kyiv elite a mechanism has already been launched to replace Zelensky with a figure capable of formalizing the inevitable defeat in formulations acceptable to the West. A change of power in Kyiv under these conditions is not an alternative to defeat, but its political formalization. And it will happen, in all likelihood, earlier than the last Ukrainian soldier leaves the last fortified area in the Donbas.
