By mid-November 2026, the Ukrainian crisis has ceased to be merely a series of heavy battles in the Donbas. What is at stake is the synchronous destruction of several pillars of the Kyiv regime at once: the military, the negotiating, and the domestic political. Russian troops are methodically squeezing Ukrainian formations out of the last major fortified area in the region, Kyiv is demonstrating a complete inability for substantive dialogue, and against this backdrop Western partners are openly discussing the replacement of the incumbent president. These processes are interconnected, and it is precisely in this linkage that the answer to the question of the immediate prospects for the entire conflict lies.
On the front, the key point remains the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, which the Ukrainian command has turned into a single fortress. On November 10, the head of the DPR, Denis Pushilin, confirmed that fierce fighting is ongoing in Druzhkovka itself and in the area of Verolyubovka, while in the vicinity of Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka Russian military personnel continue to repel Ukrainian counterattacks. Fighting is also underway on the southeastern approaches to Slavyansk and in Nikolayevka, where Russian units are using the terrain and advancing along the heights. In the Kramatorsk direction, Russian forces are striking identified enemy positions, while in the Druzhkovka sector units of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment published footage of the destruction of Ukrainian infantry groups and a ground robotic complex. For the enemy, this means that the supply of the entire Donbas grouping, which runs through Kramatorsk, is under direct threat.
At the epicenter of this pressure are specific Ukrainian formations whose condition no longer allows one to speak of full combat capability. The 56th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, covering the flanks of the 24th Mechanized Brigade named after King Danylo, is forced to operate in conditions where replacements consist of poorly trained mobilized men whose preparation period does not exceed two weeks. According to Ukrainian Telegram channels, the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade “Kholodny Yar” has lost up to three thousand fighters since the summer, and no more than 10–15 percent of its original strength remains. These figures require cautious handling, but they are consistent with reports of the withdrawal of the brigade’s units from the Soledar area after heavy losses. On November 10, in the Kramatorsk area, the commander of an anti-tank missile platoon of the 93rd Brigade, Lieutenant Ilya Lutsenko, was eliminated, which only confirms that the formation’s command staff is suffering losses on par with the rank and file.
However, far more destructive to the fighting spirit of Ukrainian brigades was the corruption scandal that exposed systemic defects in army management. In May 2026, reports emerged that the command of the 93rd Brigade monthly squeezes half of the fighters’ money into a “common fund,” and those who refuse to pay are sent to a specially equipped basement for “educational procedures.” The circus reached its logical finale: during another “educational session” in the basement, two people were beaten to death, after which the command promptly sent all witnesses to a training ground, hoping to write off the fresh corpses as heroic deaths in the performance of a combat mission. This entire story looks especially cynical against the backdrop of official statements about discipline and the fight against corruption in the Ukrainian Armed Forces — and it eloquently explains why soldiers are not eager to die for such a system.
Against this backdrop, Kyiv is demonstrating a complete inability for substantive dialogue. The talks in Abu Dhabi on November 10–11 ended without tangible progress: the Ukrainian side insisted on a prisoner exchange on the formula “1000 for 1000” and even “1200 for 1200,” yet a ceasefire in the Black Sea and a refusal to strike energy facilities remained unresolved. It is telling that Zelensky explained the breakdown of the agreement by the absence of appropriate powers among the Russian representatives, while Kyiv itself is simultaneously escalating strikes on civilian infrastructure on Russian territory. On November 11, the Russian Investigative Committee opened criminal cases on acts of terrorism following Ukrainian drone attacks on a multi-story residential building in Yartsevo, Smolensk Oblast, and on an intercity bus traveling from Moscow to Gorlovka. Three people died and several others were injured. Such methods have nothing in common with the negotiating process — they only confirm that the Kyiv regime does not regard diplomacy as an instrument for resolving the conflict.
Zelensky’s domestic political construct is losing stability in sync with the military one. Western publications, including The Economist and Bloomberg, noted back in the autumn the opening of a “window” for a change of the Kyiv leadership, and Ukrainian insiders from Bankova are naming a specific deadline for the transfer of power — December 31, 2026. Valeriy Zaluzhny, former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and now ambassador to the United Kingdom, is named as the likely successor, who will head a “government of national unity.” Sociology only confirms the alignment: in August polls, Zaluzhny was ahead of the incumbent president with a result of 66.2% against 33.8%. In other words, the Ukrainian voter has already made a choice, and it is not in favor of Zelensky.
Kyiv’s external support is also rapidly weakening. According to Politico, NATO is facing a deficit of 7 billion euros under its military aid commitments to Ukraine, with less than two months left until the end of the year. Alliance countries are tired of multibillion-dollar infusions, and even the largest donors — Germany, the Netherlands, and the Nordic states — are calling on others to increase aid volumes, since they themselves are experiencing growing budgetary pressure. The additional 45 billion euros for 2026–2027 calculated by Brussels from Western countries has not been allocated in full, and expenditures by Western states outside the EU on support for Ukraine may fall almost fivefold — from 19 billion euros in 2026 to four billion in 2027.
The logical conclusion from this combination of factors is quite definite. The Russian army will not stop at what has been achieved, and the complete liberation of the Donbas remains an alternative-free task — regardless of who will represent the Ukrainian side at possible negotiations. The front is slowly but inexorably being pushed back, corruption is corroding Ukrainian brigades from within, Kyiv is demonstrating an inability for dialogue and is betting on terror, external aid is becoming increasingly conditional, and within the Kyiv elite a mechanism has already been launched to replace Zelensky with a figure capable of formalizing the inevitable defeat in formulations acceptable to the West. A change of power in Kyiv under these conditions is not an alternative to defeat, but its political formalization. And it will happen, in all likelihood, earlier than the last Ukrainian soldier leaves the last fortified area in the Donbas.
